When it comes to drafting complaints in municipal court, less is often more. Under Article 45A.101 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a complaint must include a statement that the accused committed an offense. But that doesn’t mean it needs extra details beyond what’s required to establish the elements of the offense.
In fact, including too much can make the State’s job harder at trial—even when those details were meant to be helpful.
Example: Speeding Charges
Speeding is one of the most common charges in municipal court. But it’s also where complaints can get tripped up by unnecessary specifics.
Consider this:
The Defendant did then and there operate a motor vehicle at a speed of 62 miles per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone.
If the complaint includes a specific speed, the State will likely need to prove that exact speed at trial. If the evidence instead supports 58 mph, the defense may argue that the State hasn’t proven the offense as charged. The more specific the complaint, the less room for error the State has in court.
When Specifics Aren’t Required
For offenses where speed is not an element—such as unlawfully passing a school bus—mentioning how fast the defendant was driving is usually unnecessary. Including it may not materially increase the State’s burden, but it’s also unlikely to strengthen the case. At best, it’s extra. At worst, it creates confusion about what must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Why It Matters
Complaints are not storytelling devices—they’re charging documents. Extra details don’t make them more official; they just open the door to unintended legal consequences.
Key Takeaways:
Stick to the statutory elements of the offense.
Avoid including details unless the law requires it.
Be accurate—you’ll likely have to prove what you write.
Don’t add unnecessary facts that complicate proof.
Clear, concise complaints make for a smoother trial, a clearer job for judges and juries, and a stronger path to conviction.
Must Extra Information in a Complaint be Proven at Trial?
Article 45A.101 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides the necessary information to include when drafting a sufficient complaint to initiate criminal proceedings in municipal court. This blog will focus on Article 45A.101(a)(4), which requires either a statement that the accused has committed an offense or that there is good reason to believe, and the affiant does believe, that the accused has committed an offense.
In a Complaint, Less is More
To satisfy Article 45A.101(a)(4), simply stating the statutory elements of the offense alleged is sufficient. There is no need to include specific details related to how the elements were met. For example, if the State charged a person with speeding under Section 545.351 of the Transportation Code, the complaint should convey that the person committed each element by tracking the exact language of Section 545.351, such as “[drove] a vehicle at a speed greater than [was] reasonable and prudent under the conditions….” The precise speed that the vehicle was allegedly travelling might be relevant at trial, but it is not an element and, therefore, should not be included in the complaint.
There may be a temptation to emphasize the severity of an alleged offense by including additional details. However, unnecessary details will create additional hurdles that the State would likely need to confront at trial. For example, would the State now need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was traveling at the exact speed alleged in the complaint?
Collins, Surplusage, and Variances
Including the alleged miles per hour traveled is an example of “surplusage.” Surplusage is unnecessary or extra language. Surplusage is often a description of evidence that the State plans to use at trial. When there is a difference between what is in the charging instrument and what is ultimately proven at trial, it is called a variance. In 1973, the Court of Criminal Appeals established a rule about surplusage: if information included in the complaint was “descriptive of that which is legally essential to charge a crime it must [have been] proven as alleged, even though needlessly stated.” Collins v. State, 500 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
Gollihar and Materiality
In 2001, the Court overturned the rule laid out in Collins. In Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001), a man was convicted of stealing a go-cart. In the charging instrument, the State alleged that the stolen go-cart’s model number was 136202. At trial, the evidence showed that the model number was actually 136203. Here, the complaint contained both surplusage and variance. The court of appeals ordered an acquittal because, under Collins, even though the state proved all the elements of the offense, the state did not prove that the defendant stole a go-cart with model number 136202.
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and set out a new test: materiality. The Court advanced a two-factor test to determine if a variance between what is in the charging instrument and what is proven at trial is material: (1) whether the charging instrument informs the defendant of the charge against him sufficiently to allow him to prepare an adequate defense at trial and (2) whether the charging instrument would subject the accused to the risk of being later prosecuted for the same crime. In Gollihar, the Court concluded that the incorrect model number did not impair the defendant’s ability to prepare his defense, which did not depend on the model number alleged. Furthermore, the variance created no risk of double jeopardy. Because the variance was immaterial, the original conviction was reinstated.
Conclusion
When looking at our earlier hypothetical, must the State prove the exact speed that the defendant was driving as listed in the complaint? Because of the Gollihar test’s subjective, case-by-case nature, it depends. The answer would likely hinge on the specific nature of the accused’s defense. If the defendant had prepared his defense by seeking to rebut the exact speed alleged in the complaint, the State would likely need to prove the exact speed alleged under Gollihar. But if the defendant argues that he was not even driving a car that day, the State might not need to prove the exact speed alleged. Fortunately, well-drafted complaints that do not include unnecessary information are not subject to the Gollihar test.
Check back tomorrow for some Tips for Effective Charging!
Since 2023, Section 62.115(d) of the Government Code has required clerks to report misdemeanor theft convictions to the Secretary of State (SOS) for the purposes of juror disqualification. As noted on Page 7-20 of TMCEC’s Level 1 Study Guide, however, due to security reasons regarding the use of a statewide database, municipal court clerks must report such convictions to the county where the court is located—not directly to the Secretary of State. The county then reports to the SOS. This directive is not in the Government Code, but it has been confirmed by the SOS.
But this begs an important question: where or to whom in the county should municipal courts send this report? The Government Code does not tell us. And to complicate matters further, municipal court clerks from various counties all report doing it differently. One municipal court sends the list to the County Clerk while another court stated that the County Clerk will not accept it so they send it to the Voter Registrar. Yet another court reports that their practice is to send it to the District Clerk.
Bottom line? Communicate, communicate, communicate. If you do not have an established practice in place, set up a meeting with county officials to determine where they want the report sent. Document your communications, as well as reports sent, to avoid any notion that your municipal court is not complying with Section 62.115(d).
Texas courts work every day to ensure the fair, timely, and efficient administration of justice. To support and recognize these efforts, the Texas Judicial Council created the Centers of Excellence Program. Centers of Excellence is a statewide initiative designed to help courts assess their administrative practices, strengthen performance, and demonstrate their commitment to serving the public.
The Centers of Excellence Program is administered by the Office of Court Administration (OCA) and is open to courts at every level of the Texas judiciary, including municipal courts. The program provides a structured process for courts to evaluate their operations and implement improvements that support effective court administration. Importantly, the program remains voluntary, allowing courts to participate if and when they are ready to evaluate their practices and pursue recognition..
Participating courts complete four key phases:
1. Outreach and Review – After contacting the OCA, courts create a Court Review by evaluating their current practices and performance and supporting their assessment with documentation and reporting.
2. Implementation – Following the Court Review, the OCA will prepare and present a Court Profile which highlights each court’s strength and identifies areas for improvement. Using the Court Profile, each court will begin working on their performance areas and collecting key documents.
3. Assessment – As the court works through implementation it will inevitably generate or surface documents which outline court processes and procedures like case management plans, communications plans, or employee codes of conduct. The OCA reviews these reports and follows up with a site visit.
4. Nomination and Recognition – Following the onsite, OCA then evaluates the whole process from start to finish with an eye on key changes made across all performance and compliance areas and completes a nomination report. This nomination report highlights the work the work each court puts into the process as well as their ongoing pursuit of excellence. Once the report is complete, the court may be submitted to the Texas Judicial Council to be nominated as a Judicial Center of Excellence.
Courts recognized under the program are reassessed periodically to support continuous improvement.
The program focuses on four key areas of court performance areas:
● Governance – maintaining transparency, accountability, and sound leadership ● Court Operations – effectively managing court services and administration ● Caseflow Management – using data to resolve cases efficiently and fairly ● Access and Fairness – ensuring court processes are understandable and accessible
Additionally, the program evaluates compliance in five primary areas:
● Judicial Reporting Requirements – submitting required reports to the Office of Court Administration, including court activity reports and appointments and fees reports. ● Court Security Reporting – ensuring courthouse security committees are established and court security incident reports are submitted as required. ● Indigent Defense Requirements – implementing and coordinating with the county’s indigent defense plan.. ● Fines and Fees – complying with statutory requirements for collecting fines and fees, including notice requirements, determining ability to pay, and providing alternatives to payment when needed. ● Guardianship Abuse, Fraud, and Exploitation – maintaining appointment lists and rotation systems for court appointments and participating in guardianship compliance efforts when applicable.
Programs like Centers of Excellence highlight the important work courts already do while providing tools for continuous improvement. By encouraging courts to review their operations, strengthen compliance with administrative requirements, and adopt best practices, the initiative supports a more effective and accessible judicial system for all Texans.
For additional information, courts should review information about the program on the Centers of Excellence page or by emailing COE@txcourts.gov.
Recent changes to the Rules of Judicial Education have created more flexible ways for municipal judges to complete their required education hours. If you’re planning your judicial education for the year, it’s worth taking a few minutes to understand the updated pathways.
TMCEC’s new video highlights these options and introduces the “Power of 4”—a concept that shows how four-hour live clinics can be combined to help judges meet their annual requirements more strategically. Watch the short video below to learn how the updated rules may work for you.
A short video explaining recent changes to judicial education requirements and how the “Power of 4” creates new flexible pathways for municipal judges.
What are the basic requirements?
Year One:
New attorney judges must complete 16 hours of live instruction at a seminar or clinic within one year of taking office.
New non-attorney judges must complete a minimum of 32 hours of in-person, continuous instruction at a TMCEC New Judges Seminar
Recurring Annual Education:
Beginning with a judge’s second year of education, all municipal judges are required to annually complete 16 hours of judicial education between September 1st and August 31st.
The required 16 hours must consist of at least eight hours of live instruction from a TMCEC seminar or clinic. The remaining 8 hours of education can be satisfied through live presentation, approved online education, or any combination of approved live events and online education. This is often referred to as flex-time.
Understanding the Expanded Mandatory Credit in Fine-Only Cases
A recent amendment to Article 45A.251, Code of Criminal Procedure, has expanded when mandatory jail credit applies in fine-only misdemeanor cases. Because municipal courts already apply multiple forms of jail credit, it is important to clearly separate what changed from what did not.
This post focuses exclusively on subsection (e) of Article 45A.251.
What This Is Not About
H.B. 16 makes no changes to jail credit under Article 45A.251(d). That provision applies when a defendant is confined on the court’s charge prior to judgment. Judges are already familiar with this type of jail credit, and it continues to operate exactly as it did before the 2025 amendment.
What This Is About
Subsection (e) modifies a separate and additional category of mandatory jail credit in fine-only misdemeanor cases—one that applies even when the confinement had nothing to do with the case that the credit is being applied to.
The Rule (Simplified)
When imposing a fine and costs in a fine-only case, the judge shall credit the defendant, at a rate of not less than $150 per day, for any period the defendant was confined:
while awaiting trial or serving a sentence for another offense; and
the confinement occurred after the commission of the offense the credit is being applied to.
Once these requirements are met, the credit is mandatory.
Why the 2025 Amendment Matters
The Pre-2025 Framework
When subsection (e) was first enacted in 2021, it applied only to confinement “while serving a sentence for another offense.” That limitation had an important consequence in fine-only cases.
No defendant ever serves a jail sentence for a fine only misdemeanor. As stated in Art. 4.14(c), C.C.P., an offense which is punishable by “fine only” is defined as an offense that is punishable by fine and such sanctions, if any, as authorized by statute not consisting of confinement in jail or imprisonment. Art. 45A.251(a) further clarifies “The judgment and sentence for a conviction in a criminal action before a justice or judge is that the defendant pay the amount of the fine and costs to the state.”
As a result, time spent in jail related to a Class C offense—whether following arrest or after a capias pro fine and commitment—did not qualify for mandatory jail credit under subsection (e). That confinement was not time spent “serving a sentence.” Therefore, before 2025, subsection (e) only applied to Class B misdemeanor or higher offenses.
What the 2025 Amendment Expanded
In 2025, the Legislature added the phrase “awaiting trial” to subsection (e). This change expands the statute to require mandatory credit for pre-judgment confinement connected to another offense, even when no sentence has been imposed.
Important clarification: Under subsection (e), both “awaiting trial” and “serving a sentence” always refer to another offense, not the case the credit it is being applied to.
What Does “Awaiting Trial” Mean?
By adding “awaiting trial,” the Legislature recognized that defendants may spend time in jail or prison before judgment “for another offense” and that confinement may now trigger mandatory credit in a fine-only case. While “another offense” is not defined, we can turn to the statute for some clues about what this means. Article 45A.251 is the Judgment statute, instructing judges about the specific procedure and requirements in entering judgment for the class C case before them. In subchapter (e), “another offense” indicates that the analysis regarding mandatory credit is for time spent on a different case than the one for which judgment is being entered. This could be another offense pending or adjudicated in another court (like a county or district court, for example) or even another case in the same court.
The statute does not define “awaiting trial,” and there is currently no case law interpreting the phrase in the context of Art. 45A.251(e). The most prudent approach may be to consider any time spent in jail before judgment as time spent “awaiting trial” regardless of whether a trial ultimately took place.
Following this approach, the other offense could be a Class C charge, such as public intoxication, if the defendant was confined following arrest.
What the Amendment Did Not Change
Although the 2025 amendment expanded eligibility, it did not eliminate important limits.
A Class C offense can never generate qualifying confinement through “serving a sentence.” In municipal and justice courts, the sentence must only be to pay a fine and costs to the state. Municipal courts and justice courts may not impose jail sentences for fine-only offenses. Defendants heading to jail post-conviction in municipal or justice courts are heading there not as part of a sentence but after a commitment as a result of the defendant’s failure to comply with the terms of the judgment.
Time spent in jail after a Chapter 45A capias pro fine and commitment does not qualify as “awaiting trial” under subsection (e) either. That confinement is post-judgment, and therefore the convicted defendant is not “awaiting trial.”
Subsection (e) does not convert fine-only enforcement mechanisms, via commitment to jail, into jail sentences and does not authorize fines to be “laid out” through confinement.
Timing Matters: Why This Credit Appears in the Judgment Statute
Subsection (e) appears in Article 45A.251, the Judgment statute. That placement is significant.
It gives courts clear chronological bookends:
the date the fine-only offense to which credit it being applied was committed; and
the moment judgment is imposed.
Only confinement that occurred after the offense was committed and before judgment is entered can trigger mandatory credit under subsection (e). This structure keeps the analysis grounded at the time of judgment and prevents retroactive application.
Practical Considerations for Courts
Subsection (e) credit is applied at the time of judgment, and courts can only apply it when they have information showing it applies.
In practice:
The issue is most often raised by the defendant, either orally at judgment or through a written request. Courts do have a duty to credit qualifying time served, however, and should inform defendants of the requirement.
If the defendant is present, the court may ask whether the defendant has spent time confined awaiting trial or serving a sentence for another offense since the date of the offense to which credit might be applied. The statute does not address what type of documentation is required from the defendant.
If the defendant is not present, the court may review the file to determine whether a request or documentation has been submitted.
Bottom Line
H.B. 16 expanded mandatory jail credit in fine-only cases, but it did so carefully, not categorically.
Time spent in jail before judgment in any category of criminal case may now trigger mandatory jail credit against Class C misdemeanor judgments.
Post-judgment confinement for a Class C misdemeanor remains outside subsection (e).
Handled correctly, subsection (e) provides meaningful indigency relief without undermining the structure of fine-only sentencing in municipal courts.
To learn more on this topic, there was a webinar on February 12, 2026 (offering judicial education, clerk certification credit, and CLE) titled Jail Credit in Municipal Courts: Surveying the 2026 Landscape. That webinar is now available on-demand.
In one week, TMCEC will host its next 4-Hour Virtual Clinic, Protecting Court Personnel: Security, Privacy, and Planning, a live, interactive program designed to address the evolving risks facing judges, clerks, court administrators, and prosecutors.
📅 Wednesday, January 28, 2026 🕐 1:00–5:00 p.m. (Live via Zoom)
This clinic comes at an important moment for Texas courts. Court security is no longer limited to physical spaces. Personal information, online exposure, off-site threats, and emergency preparedness have become just as critical as what happens inside the courthouse. This program takes a people-first approach to court security—focusing on the safety, privacy, and preparedness of court personnel themselves.
A Live Clinic — and Flexible Education Credit
This program is offered live, allowing participants to engage with faculty, ask questions, and work through real-world scenarios alongside colleagues from across the state. It also takes advantage of the new flexibility in how judicial education hours may be satisfied, giving judges an additional opportunity to meet their education requirements through timely, focused virtual training.
Participants may earn:
4 hours of Judicial Education
4 hours of Clerk Certification Credit
3.25 hours of CLE (including 1 hour of ethics)
What the Clinic Will Cover
The four-hour clinic is structured to build from individual exposure to institutional preparedness:
Court Personnel Privacy and Confidentiality – including recent legislative changes and new statutory protections
Security for Court Personnel Outside the Courtroom – addressing risks beyond the courthouse walls
Emergency Management Plans and Court Security Committees – planning, coordination, and statutory responsibilities
Case Study: The Vegas Leap – a powerful real-world examination of cascading security failures
Together, these sessions provide practical guidance courts can use immediately—whether updating internal plans, strengthening committees, or simply increasing awareness of risks that often go unseen.
Cost and Funding Reminder
$100 Registration Fee
$50 CLE Fee
Training related to court security may be paid for using the Municipal Court Building Security Fund or Courthouse Security Fund under Article 102.017(c)(12), Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which expressly authorizes continuing education on security issues for court personnel.
Register Before the Clinic Begins
This live virtual clinic will not be offered on demand, making January 28 the only opportunity to participate in this program.
With just one week to go, now is the time to register and plan to join us for an important conversation about protecting the people who keep our courts running.
Municipal Courts of Record & Chapter 55A Expunctions
Municipal courts of record are authorized to process expunctions under Chapter 55A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Chapter 55A expunctions are distinct from expunctions that all municipal courts process, such as juvenile expunctions under Article 45A.463 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or alcohol-related expunctions under Chapter 106 of the Alcoholic Beverage Code. Therefore, the following information about Chapter 55A expunctions only applies to municipal courts of record—not non-record municipal courts.
Expunction Fee Repeal and Reinstatement
In the 89th Regular Session, the Texas Legislature repealed Article 102.006 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provided for a $100 filing fee to be paid by petitioners seeking expunction under Chapter 55A, via S.B. 1667. This bill took effect on September 1, 2025.
During the second special session, H.B. 16 (known as the “court omnibus bill”) passed and was signed by Governor Greg Abbott on September 17, 2025. H.B. 16 did two important things related to the Chapter 55A expunction fee:
Reinstated Article 102.006, effective immediately, but with an expiration date of January 1, 2026.
Enacted Article 102.0061, effective January 1, 2026, which provides for a $100 Chapter 55A expunction fee.
Did the Repeal Ever Take Full Effect?
Section 51.607(c) of the Government Code states that any “imposition or change” of the amount of a court cost or fee does not take effect until January 1, the year after a regular session bill’s enactment. But does the total repeal of a cost or fee constitute a “change” for the purposes of Section 51.607(c)? This seems to be an unresolved gray area. Therefore, a common question has been whether S.B. 1667 triggered Section 51.607(c). If it did not, then the Chapter 55A expunction fee repeal took effect on September 1, 2025.
While official guidance has not yet been provided by the Office of Court Administration or Comptroller, the likely conclusion will be that Section 51.607(c) did not apply to the repealed fee. A “change” is distinguishable from an elimination and typically covers situations where a cost or fee increases or decreases. Furthermore, if 51.607(c) applied to Article 102.006’s repeal, then the temporary reinstatement of Article 102.006 during the special session would be meaningless. If this interpretation holds true, courts of record should have ceased assessing the $100 Chapter 55A expunction fee for petitions filed beginning on September 1, 2025.
Because, however, the Legislature reenacted Article 102.006 effective September 17, 2025, the period where the fee should not have been assessed lasted a mere 16 days. Courts of record were authorized to resume assessing the $100 fee for petitions filed on or after September 17, 2025. Note that because Article 102.006 was reinstated during a special session—and Section 51.607(c) only applies to costs and fees imposed during a regular session—the reinstatement took effect immediately and was not affected by Section 51.607(c).
Putting It All Together
If a petitioner paid a $100 expunction fee for a Chapter 55A expunction petition filed from September 1, 2025, to September 16, 2025, they might come to the court requesting a refund. Or perhaps courts of record will choose to proactively issue refunds in the event they assessed any fees in this timeframe. The following table illustrates which petitions should have the $100 fee attached if TMCEC’s current interpretation holds true:
Heads up, court personnel: HB 2282 changes the warrant fee, but the increase doesn’t apply in every case starting September 1, 2025. The rules depend on both the date of offense and the timing of when the fee is assessed.
House Bill 2282 (89th Legislature) amends Article 102.011(a), Code of Criminal Procedure. It raises the reimbursement fee for executing or processing an arrest warrant, capias, or capias pro fine from $50 to $75. HB 2282 takes effect September 1, 2025.
Because this change involves court costs, its application depends on both the date of offense and the timing of assessment of the fee.
Key Points
Offenses before September 1, 2025
For offenses committed before 9/1/2025, the fee is permanently capped at $50, regardless of when the warrant or capias is issued, executed, or assessed.
Offenses on or after September 1, 2025
For offenses committed on or after 9/1/2025, the potential warrant or capias fee is $75.
But under Government Code § 51.607, no new or amended court cost may be assessed until January 1, 2026.
That means the $75 fee applies only when the fee is assessed on or after 1/1/2026.
Assessment may occur at different points
Most costs are assessed at the time of judgment. Fees are not assessed prior to judgment.
Some costs, like the fee for executing a capias pro fine, are assessed after judgment when the service actually occurs.
In both cases, the same effective-date rules apply:
Offense on or after 9/1/2025, and
Assessment of the fee (whether at judgment or later) on or after 1/1/2026.
Putting It Together
Offense Date
Fee Assessed (time of judgment or later)
Result
Before Sept 1, 2025
Any time
$50
On or after Sept 1, 2025
Fee assessed before Jan 1, 2026
$50
On or after Sept 1, 2025
Fee assessed on/after Jan 1, 2026
$75
Important Caveat
This analysis reflects the likely application of HB 2282 based on Article 102.011(a), C.C.P., and Government Code § 51.607. However, the Office of Court Administration (OCA) is responsible for publishing the official interpretation of cost changes in the Texas Register. Courts should look to OCA’s publication for the final word on implementation.
👉 Bottom line: Don’t assume the $75 fee applies automatically on September 1, 2025. The increase only takes effect when both the date of offense and the date of assessment of the fee meet the statutory requirements.
This year, the Texas Legislature passed S.B. 293, which overhauled Chapter 33 of the Government Code (“State Commission on Judicial Conduct”). One change that is likely to get municipal judges’ attention is new Section 33.022(b-2). This law requires the SCJC to provide notice to a judge within five business days of dismissing a complaint against him or her if it was dismissed due to being unfounded, frivolous, or having administrative deficiencies.
Until now, judges have typically been unaware of such dismissals: they usually occur soon after the SCJC receives the complaint and prior to a full investigation. And as one can imagine, such dismissals are common. No matter how ethical and law-abiding a judge is, there are individuals out there that will still file complaints against him or her. In the past, the judge would probably never know about such complaints. Now they will.
Therefore, all municipal judges should be prepared for the possibility of receiving increased communications from the SCJC related to dismissed complaints against them. If a judge receives notice of a dismissed complaint under Section 33.022(b-2), there is no need to contact SCJC or be alarmed. Ron Bennett, Chief Investigator at the SCJC, expects such notices to be commonplace moving forward.
If the SCJC has the judge’s e-mail address on file, any notice under Section 33.022(b-2) will be sent via e-mail as well as through the U.S. Postal Service. If there is no e-mail address on file, the notice will only be sent by snail mail.
To update their e-mail and/or mailing address with the SCJC, judges may e-mail information@scjc.texas.gov or call 512.463.5533.
Full Court Press 